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CHAPTER I

MIDDLE-ROAD ECONOMY
After this second world war will come peace.

Soldiers re-

leased from the armies will seek civilian jobs again.

Fac-

tories which are building tanks will go back to building
trucks and tractors.

Factories making rifles will return to

making washing machines or vacuum cleaners.

The nations of the

world will face the difficult problems of twisting their economic life from a war pattern to a peace pattern.

These prob-

lems are especially acute for the large industrial nations;
they are especially acute for America.
When the pressing war needs are over, then America will
have to decide what sort of industrial economy she is to have.
We shall have three general roads before us:
left; and the middle.

the right; the

If we choose the road to the right, we

shall choose the old laissez-faire economy of, let us say, the
1880's before the Sherman Anti-trust Act.

This is unthinkable.

Or perhaps it might be some milder gradation of "comparatively"
laissez-faire economy, such as we had in the 1920's, with only
a

~

alphabet commissions attempting to direct business from

Washington.

It seems very unlikely that we shall take this

road to the right.

First, because the resulting industrial

anarchy seemed unable to give us economic security, and powerless to protect us from depressions.
1

Secondly, because the

2

war-intrenched New Deal will doubtless be unwilling

to~make

the sacrifice of its alphabet bureaus that would be necessary
for a return to the pre-New Deal status of the 1920's.

The

road to the right seems an unwise choice even if it were posIn this booklet, we do not attempt to prove that this

sible.

road can only lead to failure.

We take it for granted.

The road to the left also lies before us.

It will mean

a permanent New Deal with wartime powers projected into peace
time; with a permanent peace production board, a permanent
office of price administration, a permanent and powerful grip
on business by Washington burocracy.
ism.

Private property will continue.

It will mean state SocialEven the large key in-

dustries such as steel, will continue to be owned by private
stockholders.

Practically, however, the total control over

these industries will be in the hands of the government.

The

government will dictate prices at which the goods may be sold,
the volume and quality to be produced, the types of products
to be introduced or

withdra~~

from the market.

The government

will control labor, dictating where and when it may work, for
what wages, at what hours, under what conditions.

Now while

we are at war doubtless we need this form of State Socialism
in order that our entire industry may be coordinated into one
gigantic war effort.
to work.

At any rate, we have it.

And it seems

Not a few social planners proclaim that this social-

istic road to the left 1s the only wartime road, and the only

peacetime road
war, go

~or

America to

~ollo..

They say:

A~t~

the

le~t.

But·State Socialism cannot help us as a permanent measure.
It will lead us dangerously close to Totalitarianism; it will
plunge us in the quicksands
well imperil the rights

.

o~

o~

burocratic

ine~~iciency;

it may

the individual; it will probably

stagnate business initiative which is so necessary in our dynamic economic order; it will take over
better be
surely

per~ormed

~ail

~ctions

by smaller groups than the state.

~ailure;

it

~or

It will

to bring us lasting economic security and liberty.

We do not prove here that the road to the
to

which can

le~t

can only lead

that would require another booklet; we simply take

granted as provable elsewhere.

We propose in this booklet a third road for the government

America's business

o~

a~ter

the war.

road to the right nor a road to the
road.

le~t;

It is neither a
it is the middle

It is the Popes' Plan for Industrial Democracy.

trial Democracy means the

sel~

ic, vertical, vocational groups
to the political state.

government
o~

o~

Indus-

industry by organ-

labor and management subject

We call Industrial Democracy the

middle road because it excludes the old rugged individualism
and business anarcby

o~

the right, and because it excludes the

super-imposed, burocratic control of the huge political
machine,

o~

the

le~t.

Since it is

~ounded

upon organic voca-

tional groups, it is closer to, and more able to protect the

4

individual than the state is close to him and able to protect
~

him.

Since it is founded upon these groups it is better able

to lead the individual and force him if necessary, to cooperate for the good of the vocational group and the entire economic order.

The old rugged individualism was unable to effect

cooperation for the common good.

Industrial Democracy is

neither excessively individualistic, nor is it totalitarian.
It is the middle road.
Since this thesis treats Industrial Democracy, it will
not specifically treat any political system, either international or national.

It will not treat global politics,

an

international league, an international police force, or an international economic planning board regulating markets and
access to raw materials, even though these institutions would
very much affect an' Industrial Democracy within any one nation
such as America.

It would expand this project beyond workable

measure to treat these problems here.

Moreover we shall not

treat national political problems, at least to the extent that
they are purely political.

Thus we do not concern ourselves

as to whether a republic might be a better form of government
than an aristocracy or a monarchy.

However, there is one

political fact which is vitally necessary if our Industrial
Democracy is to work well; namely, political Democracy.
is,

that

we should have a political system in which the power is

recognized to be radicated in the people by God, whether that

5

power expresses itself through representatives, "blue.ploods",
or a monarch.

Thus any form of Totalitariansm which claims

to be the source of civil rights makes Industrial Democracy
impossible.
Secondly, we shall not treat specifically any problems
of economic recovery or stability.

We shall not discuss

whether or not prices should be forced up or down, or questions
of wages, interest, rents or profits, or questions of business
cycles, of gold, of banking, of strikes.

Nor shall we discuss

the problem of competition versus monopoly.

That problem is

always with us - with or without the vocational group system.
Hence it requires separate treatment.
What

we~

treating in this Thesis is the machinery for

solving these problems of economic recovery and stability.
We believe that the best machinery is Industrial Democracy.
We ask:

Do the principles of ethics, political science and

economics provide us with a plan for a better organization of
our business life than the one we now have?
ciples be applied to practical life?
tions:

Yes.

Can these prin-

We answer to both ques-

We are discussing the feasibility and desirabil-

ity of an economic
We are not treating

quasi~state
the~onomic

within the political s t a t e . '
problems which our economic

quasi-state will have to meet once it is set up.

We are simplT

asking whether it can, and ought to be set up in the first
place.

6

We are well aware of the many obstacles in the war of
establishing Industrial Democracy in America - obstacles such
as a huge national debt, the need for planned tood production
immediately after the war, the fact that when powers have
been once granted to the government it is desperately hard to
withdraw them, etc.

We believe that an Industrial Democracy

can be attained, but not overnight, and not without education,
propaganda and study.

We shall not treat here - except in

passing - ways and means of actually "selling" Industrial Democracy to the American people.

However we shall treat many

difficulties which the social "salesman" as well as the social
engineer must know something about.
fore, of attaining a

midd~e

The importance, there-

road solution, especially for those

who have the Christian concept of society, can hardly be overestimated.

As Wilfrid Parsons, S.J. recently put it:
It seems to me that ••• we may be approaching
the reason for the admitted impotence of
the Church in the modern world. We are always allowing ourselves to be caught on the
horns of a dilemma. Once it was either capitalism or socialism. Again it was either
Fascism or Communism. And so on. Both
sides conspire in saying we have no choice.
The traditional murmur of the Church, "datur
tertium", is urbanely smiled away •••
But the very existence, humanly speaking, of
the Church depends on our maintaining that
"tertium", that middle way.(Catholics) cannot go to the Right, for that way lies oblivion, as in the past. We cannot go to
the Left, for that way lies destruction.
Our whole temporal salvation, and that of
SOCiety, depends on our being able to estab.-

7

lish our middle course •••
The time is running out. Even now the
collectivists and the individualists are
entrenChing themselves, creating a situa~
tion which will exclude us. Both of them
are in strategic positions in our Government, and in governments everywhere, and
they are planning for the post-war world.
They are already telling us we have to
chose between them •••
While it is true that Catholic thinkers, such as Bishop
von Ketteler, Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI and Pius XII have brought
to light principles for a middle road solution, it is also true
that these principles have not been adequately applied to
practical life; they have remained "up in the air", in the
realm of mere principles.

Therefore they have made but little

impact upon modern non-Catholic and even Catholic leaders.
Thus in this booklet we shall endeavor to apply in a practical
way the Popes' Plan for Industrial Democracy to a large, industrial nation, the United States.
blueprint for the future.

We shall not write an actual

However, we shall examine what we

believe to be the only "flesh and blood" experiment in any
modern, industrial nation of a plan closely approaching the
Popes' Plan; namely, our own National Recovery Administration
of 1933-5.

Thus we transfer from the realm of principle to

the realm of practice.

We ask:

What can the NRA tell us

I W11f;id Parsons, S.J., "Blueprint for Catholics for 1943",
America, Jan. 2, '43, 342.
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about Industrial Democracy in a Eractical way?

What4Warnings

can it give us?

What inspirations and suggestions ror a fu-

ture blueprint?

Our field of treatment, therefore, is Indus-

trial Democracy and the NRA.
What is a brief chart of the course we shall travel
through this booklet?

First, we shall examine in some detail

the principles of Industrial Democracy, or the Corporative
Society, as proposed by the Popes, especially as found tn
"Quadragesimo Anno" and "Divini Redemptoris".

Secondly, we

shall examine the NRA, giving a brief descriptive history of
the Recovery Act and the Recovery Administration.

Then we

shall consider two general problems which the NRA uncovers
for us.

The problem of vocational group unity - whether or

not there are, or can be vocational groups with a real bond of
unity making them into big "families" - whether or not these
groups can be effectively delimited one from another.
the problem of vocational group government
legislation should evoke these groups?

And

- what sort of

What sort of 19isla-

tion can, and should, these groups pass for their own regulation?

Who did govern these groups under the NRA?

Who should

govern them?
Finally in our summary and conclusion, we shall claim
that a vocationally organized society is possible in a modern
industrial nation, that a very flexible type of blueprint is
desirable because of the great differences between the various

9

vocational groups, that the system should not be imposed from
above, that it cannot be created over night by the stroke of
a pen, but rather that it must evolve, with the initiative
coming from management and labor as much as possible.

CHAPTER II
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY DEFINED
What is the Pope's Plan for Industrial Democracy?

Catho-

lic students are not in agreement upon a satisfactory English
title for the Pope's new order.

It has been called the Corpor-

ative State, the Corporative Society, Corporatism, Solidarism,
Sodalism, the Vocational Society, the Occupational Society, etc.
We reject here the title Corporative State as too redolent of
Italian Facism.

This was certainly not the Pope's plan, as Fr.

Nell-Bruening well points out.~

For the same reason we reject

Corporatism and the Corporate Society.

The other titles men-

tioned above we reject since we believe they are not sufficiently "salable" to the American public.

We choose Industrial Dem-

ocracy2 as a title readily palatable to Americans,
1

2

clearly

Oswald Von Nell-Bruening, S.J., "Reorganization of Social
Economy" transl. by Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., Bruce, M1lwauk~e, 1936, 254-8.
The title "Industrial Democracy" certainly does present difficulties. It seems to exclude the professions such as independent lawyers, engineers, doctors, accountants, etc. In
the ideal corporative order such as the Pope's Plan, these
professions would be represented. However, we have no bette!
title than Industrial Democracy at hand. If it seems to exclude the professions we shall simply have to explain to the
professions that they are not excluded.
Moreover, our title seems to exclude agriculture.
Again we shall have to explain. Just how the farmers are to
be included in our plan of industrial self-government, we do
not say. The NRA kept hands off the farmers since the AAA
was taking care of them. We keep hands off too, in this
thesis.
10

11
~

Suggestive of the Pope's idea, and not yet too encumbered with
connotations contrary to the Pope's idea.
hold on to our title too strenuously.
the important thing.

However we do not

The idea behind it is

We would be glad to exchange our title

for a better one, even for one of those rejected above, if good
reasons were to dictate it.
We are concerned in this booklet primarily wrth the Pope's
plan as presented in the encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno", using
this presentation as a basis and a starting point.

The Pope

does not use the term Industrial Democracy; he does say that
the social order must be reconstructed on the basis of vocational groups, "ordines".

After treating the evils respectively of

excessive Individualism and excessive Collectivism, and after
enunciating his famous Principle of Subsidiarity, the Pope goes
on to say;
Now this is the primary duty of the
State and of all good citizens; to abolish
conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony
between the various ranks of SOCiety.
The aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-establishment of vocational
groups. Society today still remains in a
strained and therefore unstable and uncertain state, being founded on classes with
contradictory interests and hence opposed to
each other, and gonsequently prone to enmity and strife.

3--N~ii:Bruen1ng, 423, "Quadragesimo Anno", Nos. 81,82
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The Pope goes on to delineate in greater detail what h~ means
by "classes" and "vocational groups".
Labor, indeed, as has been well said
by Our Predecessor in his Encyclical, is
not a mere chattel, since the human dignity
of the working man must be recognized in it,
and consequently it cannot be bought and sold
like any piece of merchandise. None the
less, the demand and supply of labor divides
men on the labor market into two classes,
as into two camps, and the bargaining between these parties transforms this labor
market into an arena where the two armies
are engaged in combat. To this grave disorder, which is leading society to ruin, a
remedy must evidently be applied as sppedily as possiBle. But there cannot be question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done away with, and well-ordered
members of the social body come into being
anew, vocational groups, namely, binding
men together not according to the position
they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in SOCiety. For as nature induces
those who dwell in close proximity to unite
into municipalities, so those who practice
the same trade or profeSSion, economic or
otherWise, combine into vocational groups.
These groups, in a true sense autonomous,
are considered by many to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its natural and spontaneous development. 4
Thus the Pope seems to say that management and labor opposing each other in the arena of the labor market are therefore two contradictory classes and always prone to enmity and
strife.

A society built upon these two OPPOSing forces is in

grave disorder and is speeding to ruin.

4-------

Ibid., 423, No. 83

The only correction

13
~

of this grave disorder is the doing away with this opposition
by reconstructing society on a vocational group basis.
Does the Pope mean that management and labor as such must
be done away with?

Does he mean that in his ideal order there

must be one class:

"managerial labor", in which all members

of the vocational group will share in the management of the
various companies (at least by remote control) as well as sharing in the labor to be done?

Does he go further and say that

there can be no division within the vocational groups between
those who

~

the means of production and those who do not, but

that there must be one class only, every member of which is a
part owner of the means of production?
We do not believe the Pope means all this.

Nevertheless,

we believe that Section 83 of "Quadragesimo Anno", if taken
in isolation, leaves much in the way of clarity to be deSired,
and might well lead to misunderstandings.

In this section, the

Pope might seem to say implicitly that labor must be done away
with.

Then we ask:

Would it be possible to do away with the

opposition between management and labor without making labor a
manager-ownerj merely by some sort of new cooperation as within
a joint council within the vocational groups?

The Pope might

seem to say that this is impossible for he says "the demand and
supply of labor divides men on the labor market into two classeS ••• (like) ••• two armies engaged in combat ••• "

Therefore it

might seem that the very fact that some men are offering their

15

but rather submerged, or redistributed, into vocationa1 groups.
But does not the Pope say that the very existence of a
labor market implies a fundamental split in society?

Yes.

But,

when the Pope says labor market, he means

a) a market in which

labor is treated as a mere commodity, and

b) a market upon

whose two contending sides society is founded.
ket, taken in this sense, must go.

The labor mar-

But the Pope cannot be in-

terpreted to mean here that collective bargaining and the wage
contract must.go if these recognize the dignity of labor, and
if they are exercised within vocational groups.
Therefore the Pope does not say in this section of "Quadragesimo Anno" that the ideal Industrial Democracy must have
one class-less managing-owning-laboring group in which individual or collective bargaining will be unknown.

He merely says

that the conflict arising from a lack of the right integration
of management and labor must be done away with.
In another section. of the Encyclical, the Pope makes his
position in this matter quite clear:
In the first place, it is obvious
to all that the entire economic scene has
greatly changed. You are aware, Venerable
Brethren and Beloved Children, that OUr
Predecessor, of happy memory, had chiefly
in mind that economic regime in which were
provided by different people the capital
and labor jointly needed for production.
He described it in a happy phrase: "Capital cannot do without labor, nor labor
without capital".
Leo XIII's whole endeavor was to ad-

16

just this economic regime to the standards
of true order; whence it follows that the
system itself is not to be condemned. And
surely it is not vicious of its very nature;
but it violates ~ight order whenever capital so employs the working or wage-earning
classes as to divert business and e'conomic
activity entirely to its own arbitrary will
and advantage without ,any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice and
the common good.~
It seems clear that the system the Pope is defending is Capitalism

(wh~n

it is operating in a just manner, of course).

It

also seems clear that by Capitalism, the Pope means, among
other things, that system in which "production is regulated by
the cooperation of two groups bound by contract, one of which
possesses all necessary goods, while the other •••••• contributes
merely its personal labor" (as Goetz Briefs and Nell-Bruening
put it.)6

Therefore the Pope seems to defend here a social

system in which we have the two different classes, management
and labor, provided, of course, that social justice and the
common good are sought.

The Pope is obviously against un-

bridled ambition and violations of justice.

But he does not

seem to be against the existence in society of these two different classes, management and labor.
However, the Pope does not want the laboring class to be
entirely non-managing and non-owning in his Industrial Demo5
6

Ibid., 427, Nos. 100,101.
Ibid., 270

17

.,
cracy.

On the contrary, he wishes that steps toward

~

management and ownership for labor should be taken:
In the present state of human sOCiety,
however, We deem it advisable that the wage
contract should, when possible, be modified
somewhat by a contract of partnership as is
already being tried in various ways to the
no small gain both of the wage earners and
of the employers. In this way, wage-earners
are made sharers in some sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits.
[Italics ours] '{
Therefore the Pope wants managing-labor and indeed managingowning labor, at least to some extent.

However, he modifies

the assertion by the words "somewhat" and "in some sort" so
that he cannot be said to base his whole reconstruction of the
social order on the complete substitution (within the vocational groups) of managing-owning-laborers for managers and laborers bargaining with each other.

Indeed in the preceeding sec-

tion, he asserts that the wage contract is not essentially
unjust. 8
7
8

Ibid., 419, No. 65
The ideal of Pope Pius XI was clearly that of the widest
possible ownership of the means of production. An ownerless group might be permitted, but only ad interim, until
this wider diffusion could be achieved. Such was also the
ideal of P9pe Leo XIII: "Many excellent results will follow from this (fair wages and sacredness of private property); and first of all, property will certainly become
more equitably divided ••• lf work-people can be encouraged
to look forward to obtaining a share in the land, the result
will be that the gulf between vast wealth and deep poverty
will be bridged over and the two orders will be brought
nearer together." (Nell-Bruening, pp. 386-7, "Rerum
Novarum", No. 35).
'
,

18

.,

Thus it is clear that the Pope's Industrial Democracy does
not necessarily exclude separate groups of management and labor.
But these groups will be broken up within vocational groups,
in which collective bargaining will continue, modified by justice and the common good of each particular vocational group.
We also see that there will be a greater diffusion of productive ownership than we have at present so that "some" laborers,
at least, will also be manager-owners.
It will be well to note the Pope's own commentary on his
plan in the Encyclical "Divini Redemptoris" of 1937.

He reiter-

ates· the need for a vocational society;
We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be restored according to the true
principles of a sane corporative system which
respects the proper hierarchic structure of
society; and how all the occupational groups
would be fused into a harmonious unity inspired by the principle of the common good. 9
He also implies that in the Industrial Democracy, management
and labor and the wage contraot are not to be extinct:
We explained clearly the right and dignity of labor, the relations of mutual aid and
collaboration which should exist between
those who possess capital and those who
work, the salary due in strict justice to 10
the worker for himself and for his family.

9

Pope Pius XI, "Atheistic Communism", ("Divini Redemptoris"),
paulist Press, New York City, 1937, 13, No. 32.
10 Ibid., 13, No. 31
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The American Bishops in a pastoral letter of 1940 re-s!ate
and re-emphasize this same position of the Pope:
There must be re-established some
form of guild or vocational groups which
will bind men together in society according to their respective occupations, thus
creating a moral unity.ll
Not only must employers and employees
be organized singly and jointly, but their

~r~!~~!io~~dm~~~i~~ !~l~~!~~!~I!1ith

Chris-

Thus the Bishops state that the need for a vocationally organized society is truly imperative.

They also imply that within

this society the sparate employer and employee groups are not
necessarily to be abolished.
Many modern commentators have attempted to explain and
elaborate the principles of the Popes r Plan.

Father Wilfrid

Parsons, S.J., for instance, states that:
It should be clear, I think, that
the Pope is not talking of the "orders"
as something new to be fashioned, but as
something that already exists. Whether
they think of it or not, there is a common interest between all, employers and
employed, who are engaged, each in his
own way, in producing a certain commodity or rendering a certain service
11
12
I

Archbishops and Bishops of Administrative Board of National
Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Church and Social Order",
NCWC, Washington, D.C., 1940, 27, No. 54.
Ibid., 28, No. 56.
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Here Father Parsons would seem to exclude the

Industr~Councils

Plan of the CIO (which we shall treat in a later chapter) as
the ideal realization of the Popes' Plan.

Presumably the CIO

plan would be useful only as a stepping stone to a true vocational order.

In such an order "horizontal" labor unions, such

as the CIO and the AFL would tend to divert a laborer's loyalty
from his own vocational group to the labor movement as a whole,
and "horizontal" management 'associations would tend to make an
executive more
group.

loya~

to his class than to his own vocational

Hence such "horizontal" free associations would be a

source of disharmony in the vocational group system.

However,

such associations can be very useful as means of arriving at
the vocational order.

But they should gradually become sub-

merged in their various vocational groups.
Father Nell-Bruening sees in the Popes' Plan two separate
management and labor classes, cooperating, however, with justice:
Corporate order does not touch upon
the separation of capital and labor. Insofar, therefore, capitalistic economy as understood by the Encyclical (111,1) is
entirely possible also in a corporate order
of human society. However, the establishment of the right order for human society
eliminates from the separation of capital
and labor that side which makes it so unbearable at present; it makes full-fledged
and fully qualified professional members
of those who by their labor add to production, and thus to the common contribution
to the welfare of SOCiety; thereby it
restores them to the nation; it assures them
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of their standing in society, something
that had become lost! Thus it restores
true national order. 6
It is clearly Father Nell-Bruening's position that the Popes'
new order does not call for a complete overthrow of our old economic and social order, but only a modification

of it by

grouping it vocationally under justice and charity.

Thus we

have seen that the Popes, the Bishops, and specialists in Catholic social thought have a reasonably unified and consistent set
of principles for social reconstruction.

The vocational plan

they offer we have called Industrial Democracy.
In arriving at a working definition of Industrial Democracy
we meet this question:
to be governed?

How are the vocational groups or orders

"Quadragesimo Anno" treats this briefly:

It is hardly necessary to note that
what L eo XIII taught concerning the form
of political governments can, in due measure, be applied also to vocational groups.
Here, too, men may choose whatever form they
please, provided that both justice and the
common good be taken into account. 17
Therefore, according to the Pope, if the subjects in a given
vocational group wish to rule through elected representatives
(republicanism, often called "democracy"), well and good.

If

they wish to leave actual governing to a governing class
(quaSi-aristocracy), well and good.

If they wish a kmd of

:constitutional monarch to run their group, again well and good.
16 Nell-Bruening, 233.
17 Ibid., 424, "Quadragesimo Anno", No. 86.
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Anyone of these forms of rule or any variation of them may be
more desirable in certain cases, provided that in every case
power is recognized to be from God, and provided that justice
is done and the common welfare sought.
A final question regarding the Pope's ideas on Industrial
Democracy cannot be put aside.

How is industrial Democracy

to be brought about - by "compelling" social legislation imposed
from above by the state - or by the initiative and control of
the vocational groups themselves, helped and unified merely
by the "enabling" legislation of the state?
on this are clear.

The Pope's views

By his famous "Principle of Subsidiarity",

and by his direct statement, (quoted above) that vocational
groups are "in a true sense, autonomous",

he shows that he

does not wish the groups either to be established or run b,y a
domineering state, imposing them from above.

He recognizes

the fact that some of the initiative and most of the legal
authorization required for the beginning of the vocational order would have to come from the state.

He states, as we said,

that the ",aim of social legislation must therefore be the reestablishment of the vocational groups ••• "

Howeve~,

Parsons points out, a better translation would be:

as Father
"The

social-political art, therefore, must set itself to re-establishing the 'orders'".

The standard English version might

create the impression that the Pope wished the vocational

r

!
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gt'OUPS to be the mere creatures of goverIllJent.
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However the Pope

JIlerely wished a minimum of "enabling" legislation to launch
t~e

groups who would be expected to do most of the work for

t~eir

own organization and management themselves.

Thus the

pope's .Plan is a far cry from any hue of Fascism or Totali tar-

j.a.n1 sm •

bz

CHAPTER

III

THE NRA EXPERIMENT
The National Recovery Act and Administration are as dead
as a dodo.

But since they were the only "flesh and blood",

practical experiment of a plan somewhat resembling the Pope's
Plan in any modern industrial nation,a post-mortem examination
of them is worthwhile.

There were other corporative experiments

in Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Italy.
us very much.

None of these can help

The Italian Corporative state was a Fascist Dic-

tatorShip, and hence not the Pope's plan at all.

The Corpora-

tive plans of Portugal and other small countries have been excellent, and in some cases highly successful.

However, because

they are found only in small countries whose economic life depends upon fishing, small agriculture and crafts, they are

on~

of negligible assistance in providing precedent for large
countries whose economic life depends upon large scale agriculture, mining and mass-production.

The former German cartels

might have been a help since they took place in a large industrial nation.

However because their organization was excess-

ively loose and because they made no pretence at being more
than highly cooperative trade associations, they were too far
removed from the Pope's plan to be of much assistance to us.
The NRA, therefore, was the only large attempt at industrial self-government.

It is dead and no doubt justly so.
25
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we can learn much by studying its life and the reasons for its
demise.

In fact we are all but compelled to do so if we would

bring our plans for Industrial Democracy out of the skies of
principle down to the brass tacks of practice.

In this matter

we follow the example of those who are attempting to plan a
post-war league of nations.
plans "ab· ovo".

They do not simply start writing

They turn back and study the old League of

Nations, which, like the NRA, is also dead as the dodo, but
which can tell us many things about launching a new league,
things we could learn fro. no other source.

Hence our justifi-

cation for bringing NRA back from the grave.
The NRA dwelled among us for just two years - between the
summer of 1933 and the summer of 1935.

On June 16, 1933,

Congress passed, and the President Signed, the National Industrial Recovery Act.

We were at the bottom of the Great Depres-

sion and at the beginning of the New Deal.
parts, or titles;

The Act had three

the first was concerned with the organiza-

tion of industry and was to remain in force for two years; the
second created a vast public works program)
miscellaneous activities.
I

first title.

the third treated

We shall consider here only the

The Act began with a declaration of policy.

" ••• It is hereby declared to be the
policy of Congress to remove obstructions to
the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount
thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of indus-
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trY for the purpose of cooperative action
among trade groups, to induce and maintain
united action of labor and management under
adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive
practices, to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production ••• to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to
reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve
standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industr~ and to conserve natural
resources. nl Utalics our~
It is clear from this declaration of policy that the NRA had at
least a double purpose, first, to promote recovery by various
devices; second to induce certain needed social reforms.

In

this booklet it is important to note that we are concerned
only with the second purpose of NRA, namely, social reforms.

-

In a way, it was unfortunate that these two purposes shOUld
have been joined in one act, for Recovery had to be produced
at once, but Reform is something which should come slowly.
The purpose ofNlRA reminds us very much of "Quadragesimo
Anno".

The Act stated that it wished to promote the organiza-

tion of industry among trade groups and to induce united action
must

of management and labor.
re-~stablish

The Encyclical states that we

vocational (trade) groups and abolish con-

flict between classes with divergent interests.
1

We certainly

Lyon, Homan, Terborgh, Lorwin, Dearing, Marshall, "The National Recovery Administration", The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1935, 889.
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do not claim that the NIRA was an exact statement or the Pope's
Plan.

But we do claim that it approached the Pope's Plan

rather closely both in theory and in application.
It will be interesting to consider brierly the more important sections or the NIRA.2
icy or the Act.

Section One declared the pol-

This is given above.

Section Two empowered·

the President to set up the vast machinery needed ror the administration or the Act, and also to delegate his powers to
his chosen administrators.

Also, this section limited the ex-

istence or NIRA to two years or less.

Section Three contained

the meat or the Act ror it gave the procedure by which the
codes (or laws or the various trade groups) were to be drawn
up.

It stated that the initiative towards rorming the codes

should come rrom trade associations.

The President might ap-

prove such codes ir he round that the applicants were not unrair to others in their trade, ir these applicants were really
representative or their trade, and if they did not "promote
monopolies or •• eliminate or oppress small enterprises."
Paragraph (b) made the approved codes legally binding, rully
equal to United States law.

Paragraph (c) stated that the

Department or Justice and the District Courts were empowered to
enrorce these "non-congressional", semi-public Codes.

Para-

graph (r) made violations or the codes a misdemeanor with a
2

Ibid., 889.
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fine of $500 a day for each offense.
Section Four (b) gave great power to the President.

It

gave him the authority to issue licenses and to revoke them for
any given trade or industry_

If he saw a business was engaged

in vicious price cutting or wage cutting he could refuse to
issue a license or he could revoke one at will if it had already been obtained.

It would, of course, be a serious misde-

meanor to do business without a license.

Thus the President

practically had powers of life or death over business.
Section Five stated that those concerns who were operating
under the code system would be exempt from all anti-trust legislation.

No doubt this was rich bait at which many big

business houses jumped.
Section Seven was the famous labor section equalling a
real Magna Charta for labor, guaranteeing its right to organize
and bargain collectively, and specifying that conditions regarding maximum working hours and minimum wages must be written into the codes and approved b,y the President.

It is impor-

tant to remember that in 1933, labor was much less powerful
than it is now, and vertical unions like the CIO were practical
ly non-existent.

Because of this fact, labor was never

adequately represented in the drafting of the codes.

This

difficulty we shall treat at greater length in a later chapter.
Finally, it should be said that the National Industrial
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Recovery Act gave unprecedented peacetime powers to the President to make and administer a considerable body of law.

The

question as to whether it was not merely "enabling" legislation but also "compelling" legislation will also be treated
in detail below.

The National Industrial Recovery Act had as its foremost
creature the National Recovery Administration.

This was the

agency created to supervise the preparation of the codes and
to enforce their observance.
the first Administrator.

Gen. Hugh S. Johnson was named

The historian, Beard describes the

process:
To supervise and press forward the
process of organizing trade, industry and
labor, the NRA was established under the
direction of Gen. Hugh Johnson, who combined
a limited amount of homely wisdom with the
irritating methods of a drill sergeant.
Leaders in commerce, industry, and trade
unionism rolled into Washington. Amid much
confusion and table pounding, codes were
drafted, approved, and put into effect.
Wrangles within and between trade associations were heard and decisions rendered.
To every individual and concern that complied with the terms of the appropriate code,
an emblem - the Blue Eagle - was awarded.
Like a sudden rash, Blue Eagles burst forth
in the windows of shops, on walls of factories, and in the advertisements of merchants. 3
Beard is perhaps a little hard on Johnson, whose pugnacity
Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, "America in Midpassage",
Macmillan, New York City, 1939, 234.
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seemed really necessary to get the stalled wheels or recovery
moving again.
The chier assistants of the Administrator4 were Assistant
Administrators ror Industry, Labor and Special Problems, the
General Counsel and the Economic Adviser. There were also
seven division administrators 5 in charge of the codes themselves, in fields ranging from the rield of mining, metals,
~ilities,

automobiles, rubber and shipping activities, to the

field or publishing and graphic arts industries.

There was a

compliance board charged with the enrorcement or the codes.
Then there were three advisory boards. 6

The Industrial Advis-

ory Board, composed of business-men, advised the Administrator
on all matters or industrial policy.

The Labor Advisory Board

was to help out with labor questions especially regarding
child labor, the right to organize, wages and hours.

The Con-

sumers Advisory Board was supposed to guide the Administrator
in problems vital to consumers - prices and quality.

This

Board, unlike the other two, was not backed up by any pressure
group.
Once the huge NRA machinery started to grind out the codeS
rrom June 1933 to March 1934, it was marked by tremendous vitality, and also orten by conrusion and even hysteria. The code-making process 7 in most cases was comparatively simple.

4--L;~~~ 55
5 Ibid., 51

~

t£ia:,

1~8
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Representative groups in each industry, usually working through
their trade associations (and therefore without labor representation) drew up codes which were then presented to the NRA for
consideration.

Public hearings were held under the direction

of deputy administrators, at which the viewpoints and objections of consumers, labor, and other interested parties could
be presented; upon the acceptance of these codes by the deputy
and division administrators, the documents were submitted to
the President or the NRA Administrator for his approval.
practice, Johnson ran the whole show.)

(In

After the proper ap-

proval , the code had all the force of a statute.

Once the

code was completed, an agency was set up in each industry,
called the Code Authority, which was indeed, the agency of
self-government in the industry.

In most cases, the Code Author

ities were merely the old trade associations in new guise, except for the occasional addition of a small number of "publicly
known" representatives.

Labor as such was given a formal

place on very few of the Code Authorities.
Compliance with the codes of fair competition and with
the President's Reemployment Agreement (which we shall describe
below) was obtained by the Compliance Division, both regional
and national, except in those cases where labor disputes were
involved.

These were handled by the newly created National

Labor Board.

Difficult cases of compliance were turned over

33
~

to the Attorney General for prosecution in the district
courts.
The difficulties attendant upon drafting the codes, and
the impossibility of one Administrator (Johnson) overseeing
everything at the same time, created a bottleneck almost from
the very start.

The NRA was supposed to pull the country out

of the depression, but the code-mill was grinding slowly and
the situation was nearly desperate.

Out of this situation the

President's Reemployment Agreement was born, on September 1,
1933.

Under this

agreement~

so-called "blanket" codes were

drawn up between the President and various individual concerns
who volunteered to enter the blanket code and who were not yet
members of

any

standard code group.

The blanket codes provided

for many conditions of fair competition including minimum
wages and maximum working hours.
And yet the gigantic task of turning out the codes did
proceed apace.

The first code to be signed was the cotton tex-

tile code, approved by the President on July 9, 1933; on July
26, the wool, textile and sbipbuilding codes were approved; on
August 4, the electrical and coat-and-suit codes; on August
19, the petroleum, iron and steel, and lumber codes.

By the

middle of May 1934, more than 4GO codes had been prepared and
signed, while an additional 300 codes already had had their
hearings completed.

A year after the establishment of the NRA
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it was estimated that some 20,000,000 workers were employed
under the Blue Eagle.
During the first half-year of the NRAfs existence, most
of its effort had been directed towards drafting the codes.
But by March, 1934, it became increasingly obvious that industry had to be educated and organized if it were to govern itself.

Therefore the NRA staff now endeavored to supply the

codes which had already been drafted with adequate administrative and enforcement machinery.

More time was spent on organ-

izing and supervizing Code Authorities, and especially now in
enforcing compliance with the codes. 8
After a year of existence, NRA was still in serious
trouble because of the enormity of its task and also because
of its own internal wrangling and confused adminttration.

The

Brookings Survey makes the following perhaps rather harsh diagnosis:
At the en~ of the first year, in spite
of numerous reorganizations and adjustments,
both in structure and in method, the NRA was
a sprawling, poorly co-ordinated, and relatively ineffective organization. Innumerable
shifts in internal mathod had kept the administrative personnel in constant confUSion,
and the code authority representatives in a
state of irritation. Morale both of NRA
and industry agencies was anything but the
best. Each NRA policy or procedural announce~
ment, followed as it was by modifications,
8

Ibid., 54
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retractions and explanations (for example,
on price policy, budgets, and government contracts) gave rise to a series of "revolts"
among industry members of various codes.
Contending factions had sprung up within the
NRA itself. Public discussion and general
opinion were both pointing toward a change
of direction for NRA. 9
The situation was rapidly drawing to a climax.
clearly saw the handwriting on the wall.

Gen. Johnson

He stated in August,

1934:
No one man can watch the operation of
450 codes - I hope we can reduce them to 250
by consolidation, but even that is too many
for one man. It needs a commission. I think
the War Industries Board model was good - a
commission of responsible executives sat to
co-ordinate activity, but it had no vote. Its
chairman was responsible and had the final
decision. lU
The crash came on September 27, 1934, when the President (with
sincere commendations of Johnson's efforts) substituted the
National Industrial Recovery Board for the single NRA Administrator. ll This Board was made up of five members (appointed
by the President), plus two ex-officio members.

It was to

have all the pow-ers and duties formerly held by Johnson.

How-

ever its work was subject to the general approval, of a bigher
committee, the Industrial Emergency Committee, which was
charged with the general policy-making of the NRA subject in

9--Ibid~, 67
10 Gen. Hugh Johnson, NRA Release No. 7119, Aug. 2, 1934;
11 address of Recovery Administrator.
Lyon, 68.
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turn to the approval of the President.

The Industrial Emer-

gency Committee was composed of the Secretaries of the Interior
and of Labor, the Chairman of the National Industrial Recovery
Board, the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment, the
Administrator of Federal Emergency Relief, and the Director of
the Committee.
The Recovery Board undertook a drastic re-organization of
the NRA machinery.

(For chart of final set-up, see page 37.)

The function of effecting compliance was clearly distinguished
from the function of supervising the codes.

Divisions were

re-grouped on the basis of function, and authority was decentralized.

But the re-organization did little to stem the ris-

ing tide of opposition to the NRA.

Enthusiasm for the Act was

dying by the end of 1934, and the almost insuperable difficulties of enforcement were worrying the Administration.

Now

the Act was attacked by some of the very businessmen who had
sponsored it in the first place, a year and a half before.
None of the various pressure groups originally interested in
the NRA were satisfied that they were getting out of it anything like what they had once hoped they would.

The job of

trying to get industry to try peaceful methods of cooperation
instead of the old hit-and-run competition had seemingly
proved too big a job.

A demand for the old free-for-all

competition spread throughout the land.

We shall see in later
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chapters the detailed causes for the failure of NRA:

code

violations, fostering of monopoly, labor troubles, etc.
By this time there were over 585 Code Authorities,12
which we might call "quasi-states fT of the NRA Industrial Democracy.

Each of these little states was passing and administer-

ing its own laws or codes.

Furthermore, there were several

thousand regional and divisional agencies for administering
the codes; these might be called fTmunicipalities fT in the Industrial Democracy.

The numbers of people involved in the codes

varied from 45 workers in the Animal-soft-hair Code, to
3,500,000 workers in the Retail Trade Code.

Of course by this

time the NRA itself had become a huge organization, employing
more than 4,500 employees.

Its codes filled 13,000 pages and

were supplemented by over 11,000 executive orders which in
some cases very much affected the codes.

To say the least, it

was all very bewildering.
The end came at last, on May 27, 1935, when the United
states Supreme Court unanimously agreed 13 that the National
Industrial Recovery was null and void, in the famous Schechter
case.

The Act was found defective for two main reasons.

First,

it was claimed that the Act violated our constitutional separation of powers by illegally delegating the legislative powers
of Congress to the President in giving the President unduly
12
13

Ibid., 29.
Beard, 264.

-
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wide and sweeping powers to set up codes (laws) of fair competition and to formulate general policies.
Secondly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act went beyond
inter-state commerce and tried to regulate intra-state commerce, the which also is unconstitutional.

The Schechter

Brothers were shipping poultry into New York City from New Jersey and other states, and then selling them in New York City
at terms in violation of the Poultry Code.

The Court held that

the Schechters were engaging in inter-state commerce only during the moments when the chickens were actually being shipped.
But once the chickens arrived in New York City and were later
sold, this later action was not inter-state commerce but intrastate corrwerce ("intra" New York State), and could not be
touched, therefore, by any federal regulation such as the NRA
code.
Thus, in the summer of 1935, almost two years after its
birth, the NRA, the one great experiment in Industrial Democracy, was laid in its grave.

There can be little doubt but

that it was dead months before the Schechter case.

Not only had

it failed to bring about Recovery (with which problem we are
not concerned here), but also it had not really proved to be
Industrial Democracy at all.

Yet it was the closest attempt

that had ever been made in a 'modern industrial nation.
the least it was a "noble experiment".

To say

CHAPTER IV
THE BASIS OF VOCATIONAL GROUP

UNITY

Did the NRA believe there was a basic unity actually present within each of America's various industrial groups?

Did

the NRA find a common bond binding together everyone in the
steel business, for example, the scrub women, the puddlers, the
electricians, the chairman of the board of directors - into
one little society?

Or ,",vas such a bond of unity just consid-

ered a pious fiction of dreaming social planners?

To answer

these questions, we must first understand clearly just what is
meant by a "bond of unityfT.
Suppose a pe:.rty of travelers is shipwrecked on a south sea
island.

There are men, women, and children in the party,

Catholics, Protestru1ts and Jews, blacks and whites, businessmen, carpenters, sailors, writers, mechanics, etc.

There is no

sign of habitation on the island but it is luxurious with tropical fruits and some small game.
ty of fish.

The island is not large however, and the casta-

ways are many.
prevalent.

The surrounding sea has plen-

The food must be sought.

Fever lurks in the bush.

Tropical. storms are

Obviously there is a job

to be done if these people are to survive.
Now we ask the questions:

Is there a basis of unity in

this party of very diversified travelers?

Do the very circum-

stances of their shipwreck seem necessarily to bind them to40
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gether in a little society which is to last at least while
they are together on the island?

The answer is surely:

Yes.

These people are all "in the same boat" or on the same island.
If they are to survive, they must work together.

Some must

fish, others pick fruits, others make shelters, others make
clothes and instruments.

If there is a doctor, he will have to

tend the Sick; if there is an electricia.n, he will try to improvise a radio with v'iha t parts he has in order to call for
help, etc.

However, if each castaway insists on

doing just

what he pleases, doubtless many, or most, of the group will perish.

If they are to survive, there must be order, authority;

there must not be anarchy.

These people all have a common end,

namely survival.

Moreover, they must all use common means to

attain that end.

The radioman tries to fix up a radio not

for himself but as a common means for saving all.

on~

The fisher-

men do not catch fish just for themselves but as common food
for the whole group.
Now precisely because these people have a common end and
can only attain it by using common means, therefore basic unity
~

already among them •. It is true that they are not yet an

organized society until they set up an authority to rule themselves.

But they are potentially such a society; they should

be such a society.

The basis for unity is there.

Viha t then, do we mean by a "basis of unity"?

If people
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are so throvm together so that they all have one common end or
goal which they can only attain by common means, by working together, then, we assert, this common end and those common
means constitute a basis of unity.

Such people should form

some kind of a society.
We may now proceed to this question:

Did NRA think there

was a basis of unity within the various vocational or trade
groups of this country? The answer is: Yes. l Otherwise why
would NRA have tried to cement the various business of a trade
group into one unit obeying one Code Authority?

However, it

is important to note that NRA did not theorize very much about
the basis of vocational group unity.

Nor did it have a com-

pletely adequate concept of this unity.

The NRA planners saw

that unfair competition within the various industrial groups
and that badly plamled production were equally pulling down
together all the business houses within those groups.

There-

fore, thought these planners, we will bind these various business houses together into Code Groups according to the similar
products which they

~roduce

or services which they perform.

Thus each Code Group can solve the mutual competition and production problems of all the members of that group_

Obviously

therefore, NRA recognized the fact that all the textile businesses, to take one example, had a common end (economic prosper!~ll_!"h!ch

1

could only best be attained by common means
Lyon 415.
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(mutually fair competition, pI'icing, production, etc.)

NRA

saw, then, that there was a true basis for unity among the various trade groups.
NRA's picture may be said to be incomplete, however,
largely because it did not adequately include labor's share. 2
The unity which NRA saw was unity largely between the various
management staffs - a unity often rather closely knit in the
various traue associations, such as the Iron and Steel Institute.

This unity was not seen so clearly to include every last

workingman within each trade group.

Labor was thought of, of

course - but rather at the periphery, than at the center of
each group.

The reason for this of course is quite unuerstand-

able when we remember that "industrial fT unions were practically
unknown in 1933.

However NRA may have failed to get the com-

plete picture of vocational group unity, it certainly did .point
the way for us.

For two years it got the country to recognize

the real basis of unity which exists within our various trade
groups.

It is unfortunate that since the demise of NRA, this

basic unity has been forgotten by many.
What proof can we offer that there is, today,
sis of unity within our vocational groups?

a real ba-

(We shall consider

at this point, only those vocational groups whose area seems
2

Ibid., 120-3, 423, Also National Recovery Administration
Release No. 5418, May 31, 1934, 3.
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clearly defined, such as steel, autos, power, etc.

We abstract

here from those heterogeneous groups such as retail trade and
agriculture, since it is verydfficult to determine what businesses should be considered to be within these groups, and what
should not be so considered.)

Can we prove that there is today

a common bond of unity linking together everyone working in the
steel buSiness, for example •••• linking together the iron miners,
the ore boat sailors, the blast furnace operators, the sheetmill workers, the switch-engine engineers, the office clerks
and stenographers, the metallurgists, the engineers, the electricians, painters, carpenters, plumbers, crane operators, foremen, scrubwomen, watchmen, executives, salesmen, advertising
men, statisticians and accountants, office boys, board of directors?

Are all these people, doing so many different things,

really linked together by one common bond which we shall call:
STEEL?

Have the electricians of the Inland Steel Company for

example, more in common with all the other workers and executives of the Inland Steel Company and the other steel companies than they have with the electricians of some street-car
company, or some contracting firm?

They have.

They belong to

steel.
our proof for the above is founded on the follovdng fact:
Prosperity goes up or down in this country, primarily by industries.

(Though it is also true that when many industries con-

cur in their variations, a common variation of the whole
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business cycle is had.)

Thus it is that the whole machine-tool

industry, for example, goes up or down, rather independently
of other industries such as autos, textiles, etc.
do not deny here that
other.

~

We certainLy

industries inter-act and affect each

But we do assert that variations first begin within

industry, and first affect

~

industry.

an

The survey, nNation-

al Income in the United states - 1929-35" proves statistically
these variations by industry.

It sums up this point as

follows:
In reality, all income payments are
drafts on the national income ••• the breakdown of the national income by industrial
classification indicates sometning of the
relative importance of the various industries
in contributing to the net product of the Nation, in giving employment to gainful workers
and in disbursing compensation to individuals
for their efforts. Moreover the divergence
of trends and fluctuations in income for different industries reflects the changing nature of our industrial pattern, the stability
or instability of different industries during
various stages of business cycles, and to
some extent the interde2endence of all industries ••• (Income payment~ can be of considerable value in studying the past and planning
for the future, provided they are interpreted
correctly. {j:talics ourS] 0
3

"National Income in the United States--1929-35 ff , U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic and Foreign
Commerce, 21, cited by Rev. B.W. Dempsey, 8.3., "Corporate
Democracylf, Central Bureau Press, st. LOUis, 1941, 14.
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The "Statistical Abstract of the United States" also shows the
importance of variations come produced annually.

~

industries - of the national in-

These industrial variations seem to be

fully as important as the variations of the total income produced.
All in the Steel Industry, for example, go up and down
together, as the Industry prospers or suffers - no matter what
is happening in other industries.

All, from scrubwomen to

President, are in the same boat in the Steel Industry.

Natur-

ally they all want economic prosperity; and they all get it (or
lose it) together.
all have a common

Therefore does not this prove that they
~

- namely, mutual prosperity?

Is it not also true that all in the Steel Industry can attain this common end only by working together, that is, by
common means?

If Labor strikes, not only Labor loses but also

Management loses.

If Management mismanages, not only does

Management lose, but Labor loses too.

In other words, it means

more to an electrician in the steel business that his steel
executives do a good job of managing, than it does that some
electrician working in the contr&cting business does a good job
of being an electrician.

The steel

'elec~trician

has more in

common with the steel executives than he has with the contracting electrician because his prosperity (at least immediately)
goes up or down with the steel industry, not with the contract-
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ing business.

Now if all in the steel industry have a real

common end, which they can only best attain through common
means, then they are bound together by a common bond of unity.
There is a real basis of unity already present among them.

It

is true that this unity has not expressed itself in fully unified cooperative action.

These people have not "actualized"

their COIDlilon basic unity into an industrial society.

But since

they really have true basic unity, they are potentially such a
society.

All they need is some sort of authority to activate

and order their natural unity.

As Father Bernard Dempsey puts

it:
••• There are in our country ••• real vocational groups actually, whether they are conscious of it or not, bound together by their
common functions of producing this or that
for the nc3.tional product. When we attempt to
compute figures which will show the state of
national welfare, we immediately come face
to face with that fact ••• The corporative order, therefore, calls for the explicit recogniti~n of relationslups that are alreaQy present.
It seems clear that American business competitors in the
same industries are closely interdependent with

regard to

fair prices, fair competition, fair wages, quality, optimum
quantity to be produced, etc.

Of course, we do not deny that

all our industries are interdependent; but we do assert that
the interdependence of firms within
4

Dempsey, 15.

a trade group is primary
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and of greatest importance to those firms.

We do not deny,

therefore, the interaction between industries - the fact that,
for example, if steel prices are unduly high, steel users will
substitute lighter metals or plastics, thus causing a probable
slump in the steel business - the fact that, if coal miners insist upon unduly high wages, they will affect the price of electric power.

It is clear that disputes and problems arising

between the various industrial groups must be solved.

For this,

some sort of super-councilor board representing all the vocational groups will doubtless be necessary.
But we wish to stress here the real and close interdependence of business houses within their own industries.
fact we must begin.

With this

If one company wants to pay fair wages,

it is unable to do so unless its competitors (first of all,
within

its industry) also pay fair wages.

Of course we grant

that many firms outside of its industry may be its potential
competitors by substitute products and that, therefore, they
too must pay fair wages in order that our one company may afford
to do so.

But the problem begins, and is most acute, within

a given industry.

It must be solved first there, so that a

reasonably united industrial front may be presented to other
substitute-product industries, that the remaining problem between the industries may be solved by some inter-industrial
authority.
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The CIO has clearly recognized this need for industry-wide
cooperation:
Obviously one company could not grant a
general increase to its maintenance workers
without putting its costs out of line with the
rest of the industry.
Such a large-cost problem requires simUltaneous consideration and action throughout the whole of an industry.5
••• Two weeks after SWOC (~he Steel Workers
OrganiZing Committee) signed its first contract
with the largest steel firm, in the spring of
1937, its officers presented several admittedly
meritorious grievances involving big cost items.
Management said; "We have signed a contract
with your union. But most of our major competitors have not. We have taken on costs through
our contract which these competitors have not
yet assumed. We're hard-pressed enough. Why
don't you bring these other companies into
line? Then wa'll see what can be done about
these grievances you are pressing that would
only raise our costs at present." The union
recognized these reasons to be sound, it accepted the fact that the extent to whic:h it
could advance the economic interests of its members was limited until every major producer in
the industry was organized and operating under
a like collective-bargaining contract. 6
[j:talics ours"J
The CIO is not talking merely about industry-wide labor organization.

It recognizes the need for industry-wide management

organization:
The limitations on union-management relations at the level of the local plant and individual firm are a constant, irresistible pressure on unions and management alike to extend
5

6

Clinton, Golden and Harold Ruttenberg, "The Dynamics of
Industrial Democracy", Harper, New York City, 1942, 303.
Ibid., 310-11
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their relations. In no small measure the industrial strife of the last few years is at- ~
tributable to the absence of'industry-wide associations of management designed especially
to work out many of these problems with national unions. 7
The CIO believes there is a basis for unity by industries becaUse of the natural interdependence of firms therein.

-It con-

siders the recognition of this fact "a natural and necessary
development ll :
Thus in steel the patterns of industrial
democracy on an industry-wide basis that prevail in the coal industries are becoming visible. That they will eventually develop into
formal conferences between two co-equal industry-wide organizations, fully empowered to
negotiate the basic terms of employment for the
industry, seems to us to be both a natural and
a necessary development. 8
Thus we have a large labor organization asserting through its
spokesmen that there is a real basis for unity among the businesses (including both management and labor) within a given
industry.

It is precisely in the greater recognition accorded

to labor in such industrial unity that the CIO program advances
beyond the NRA experiment.
The position of labor of course, is important.

There can

be no doubt that it is to labor's first interest to seek the
prosperity of its entire industry.

Ordway Tead stresses this

in his "New Adventures in Democracy":
As they (labor unions) gain inclusive
membership, maturity, and able, continuing
leadership, they are associations profoundly
7
8

Ibid., 309.
Ibid., 313.
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concerned to advance the total effectiveness
of the specific calling or industry in the total economy. The well-established union is,
and has to be, as much concerned as the associated employers of an industry, with the development of conditions which foster that industry's prosperity. There is a real sense in
which the affiliated workers of an industry
have more at stake in helping an industry to
thrive than the salaried managers or the
scattering of absentee stockholders. 9
Finally, therefore, we believe that the close economic interdependence of American business - by industries - gives solid
ground for the unification of those businesses into vocational
groups.
The vocational group unity which we have found is not unaccompanied by difficulties.

It is not alw&,ys easy to delimit

American business into workable vocational groups.

However,

this problem is not so acute in the large, rather homogeneous
basic industries, such as the fuel, raw materials, durable
goods, foods and wholesale industries.

The problem is acute in

the many smaller, more independent businesses, such as retail
trade.
First, the difficulty of overlapping definitions.

Under

the NRA, each industrial or trade group tried to define its
area of coverage.
9

But in practice, many definitions overlapped

Ordway Tead, "New Adventures in Democracy", Whittlesey
House, MacGraw-Hill, New York City, 1939, 92.
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one another either explicitly in the legal statement of the
Code Authority, or implicitly.lO

All this created severe jur-

isdictional conflicts between the various code authorities.
We present several examples:

The definition of the electrical

manufacturing business is "the manufacture for sale of electrical apparatus, appliances, material or supplies, and such
other electrical or allied products as are natural affiliates".
[Italics oursJ

This small tail-end phrase left the door wide

open to a variety of jurisdictional claims by the electrical
manufacturing co<ie authority, which could thus elbow its way
into the field of many other code authorities.

Because of a

like looseness of definition, there vvas a jurisdictional dispute between the farm machinery authority and the road machinery authority over the question:

Who should control tractors?

Conflicts of definition were also very severe in the garment
industry.

There were many code groups and each tried to define

itself so as to be unique; but

overla~ping

Some of the groups were as follows:

was wide-spread.

The Women's Coat and Suit

Group, Men's Clothing Group, Underwear and Allied Products
Group, Infants and Children's Wear Group, Blouse and Skirt Code
Group, etc.

From the above, it is obvious that the maker of

red woolen underwear might be under anyone of several codes.
Moreover, the cotton Garment Group overlapped most of the
10

Lyon, 15·0
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others.

And since it had easy wage and hour

from

requireme~s

the point of view of the employer, many manufacturers sought
refuge under it to escape the other code groups in the garment
business.
It is not easy, obviously, so neatly to define an industry
or trade as not to overlap an allied industry or trade.

liRA

ran headlong into this difficulty and was facedwith an angry
sea of jurisdictional conflicts between various code groups as
a result.

Tlus difficulty of definition remains today and will

remain in the future.

Anybody who tries to revamp America in-

to an Industrial Democracy must solve tlas difficulty of definition.

In the case of a few industries like Steel and Autos,

delimiting the area will be easy_

In the rest of our manufac-

turing, distributing, and other businesses, it will often be
difficult.

The difficulty of defining the various code groups

is really the effect

of the difficulty of classifying our

many varied businesses.
Secondly, the difficulty of classification of vocational
groups.

Under the NRA there were, in general, two types of

classification-contrasts:

"horizontal" versus "vertical"

groups, and "straight-line" versus "circular" groups.
rtHorizontal" and"vertical" groups.ll

Most of the codes

were rthorizontal" codes, that is, applying to

11

Ibid., 153

~

stage of
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manufacturing, processing or distributing a product, as for
example the Auto Group.

"Vertical n codes were codes applying

to two or more stages of manufacture, processing or distribution, as for example, the Lumber Group which extended from trees
in the forest to wooden crates and baskets.
were vertical.
be expected.

Many important code

Serious jurisdictional overlappings were to
Most of the manufacturing concerns were organized

into horizontal groups handling only the ftmanufacture and
first sale n of a definite list of products.

Si~ilarly,

the dis-

tributing concerns were organized into various specialized
groups in the wholesaling and retailing levels.

However, we

have as an opposite extreme, the oil burner group which was organized all the way from manufacture to retailing in one long
vertical code.

Of course many concerns - the majority of those

in v!-?rtical groups - were in groups handling only a few stages
of processing.
The Lumber Group was a good example of a code uniting many
businesses of varying types from allover the country.

The

producing areas for lumber were widely scattered from Maine to
Oregon and AlabamEl..
producers.

Many sma..L.L and some large firms were the

Many different types of wood were produced.

were many stages of lumber fabrication.
end-products.

There

There were many wood

It was hard to see what basis of unity would

hold together all these divergent groups against their natural
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separatist tendencies.
tion.

Many codes were possible in this situa-

Yet one all-embracing code was the result, covering

everything from ,the felling of trees to wood shipping-crate
manufacture.

This was thanks in good part to the strong trade

association organization of the lumber industry.

Yet in spite

of this strong vertical group, there were many other woodproduct groups, such as the insignificant -Nood-plug Group, the
Paper Group, the Newsprint and Paperboard Group, etc.
It is important to notice that nearly all the vertical
groups began wilh the stage of actually preparing the raw materials which were later to be processed.

This points to the

economic logic ana efficiency of the vertical organization of
industry and the resulting vertical code groups.

It was evi-

dent that in many industries the vertical set-up meant savings
and greater productivity.
paid.

Businessmen put it in because it

It was also evident that not all industries lent them-

selves to the vertical set-up.

It seems that both the

hori~

zontal and the vertical types are with us to stay.
Under the NRA, the co-existence of these two types made
for difficulties.

For example, many firms found themselves

included in a horizontal group

and in some vertical group as

well - and were thus faced with a confusing and differing array
of wage, hour, price and marketing regulations.

Again, many

distributors (retailers and wholesalers) found themselves
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subject to codes which they themselves had had little part in
forming, but which had been handed over to them by their manufacturers.
"Straightline" and "circular" groups.12

A trstraightline"

group is one that manufactures a single product or a very few
closely related products derived from the same raw materials
and selling on the same market.
an example.

The Sandstone Code Group is

A "circular" group, on the other hand, is one

that covers not only a.single product, but also a diverse
range of complementary products related only because they have
a common destination in the same end-product.

An example of

this is the Automotive Parts and Equipment Manufacturing Group,
who are united because the windshield makers, the car radio
makers, the tail light makers, the battery makers, the magneto
makers, the upholstery makers, the carburetor makers, etc.,
all put their products on the same finished end-product, the
car.
There can be little doubt that "circular" code groups
have reduced the number of basic codes and thereby the amount
of "multiple coverage" which might be imposed upon any single
business firm.
overlapping.

They have, however, created difficulties of
For example, a manufacturer who makes rubber

balls may find himself at the same time under the Toy Code
12

Ibid., 157.
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.,
Group and the Athletic Goods Group.

At once a jurisdictional

problem arises; especially if these two groups have markedly
different requirements about wages, hours, prices, etc.
the NRA, this problem was serious.

Under

The social planner of In-

dustrial Democracy will have to meet it.

Doubtless there will

hc:.ve to be both "straightline" and "circular" groups.

But the

resulting confusion will be a practical obstacle to a system
of industrial self-government.

We believe the problem can be

solved; but it will have to be met.
The third difficulty wilich arises in the attempt to delimit code groups and which has already been mentioned, is that
of "multiple coverage n • 13

By the time the NRA had reached its

death struggle there were over 750 code groups.

Many codes

often included the same uanufacturer or business house in their
constituency, so that· such a firm was "covered" by many codes
at the same time, resulting in the difficulty of "multiple coverage".

Tr~s

stubborn difficulty arose largely because of the

great diversity of opArations often found housed under the
roof of one American business house.
in the field of retailing.

Especially is this true

If there were separate codes, for

example, for retailing of food, of tobacco, of drugs, then the
average "general store drug store!! might be

13

Ibid., 158.

cov(~red

by three or

.,
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more codes at the same time, with the resulting confusion of
different wage provisions, etc.

The Brookings "National Recov-

ery Administration" cites an example of this difficulty:
An example ••• is that of a certain New ~ng
land factory which produces washing machines,
vacuum cleaners, electric motors, and other
lines, the number of applicable codes being ten.
Certain 'Nork rooms are specialized by products,
and the workers therein are clecrly under a
single code. On the othar hand, there are
metal, wood-working, and other shops where
parts are made or materials processed for all
departments. A single workman may in a single
day work under two or three codes. Or at a
single moment different workers in the same
shop may be working under five or six codes. 14
It would seem evident that the resulting wage, hour, and price
confusion in the above New England factory would make code observance often an insuperable difficulty and code enforcement
at least in some particulars almost impossible.

Loopholes and

chances for evasion of code-group requirements would abound.
Multiple coverage was caused not only by the diverse operations of many firms, but also by the vague and all-inclusive
definitions of some of the codes (as we noted above).

For

example there was a code group call(3d the "Light Sewing Industry, Except Garments".

This group, at least according to its

definition, included almost everybody and every firm doing any
stitching or sewing on a button!

Thus, multiple coverage was

inevitable.
Another aspect of multiple coverage occurred when one

+4"Ibld:,

159
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definite business function, such as trucking, would lie within
the scope of different code groups with different standards of
competition.

Brookings gives an example:

Wholly similar trucking operations are
being carried on by delivery fleets owned by
retail stores and by for-hire truck operators
performing delivery operations for retail
stores under contract. Trucking operations
performed by store-owned trucks are excepted
from the jurisdiction of the trucking code.
Since wage and hour provisions of the retail
trade code are much less onerous than those
of the trucking code, the situation tends
to induce stores to purchase and operate
their own delivery equipment at the expense
of the independent trucker. 15
Many other examples could be given which would show further the
jurisdictional confusion between the various code groups under
the NRA.
The three difficulties which we have given to show the
great difficulties involved in trying to delimit vocational
groups, are not, we believe, insuperable.

But we insist that

they prevent the establishment of an Industrial Democracy from
being an easy matter.

Granted that a few industries like Steel

and Autos may be easy to delimit, nevertheless the delimitation of the vast remaining part of Americall industry will be
far from easy.

One of the mistakes of the NRA was that it

formed too many codes too hastily.

15

Ibid., 161

The above difficulties were
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partially the result of this.

•

To this extent the future social

planner may avoid these difficulties if he plans fewer groups
(than 750) and tries to establish them more slowly.

However

much of the difficulty remains because of the very complicated
structure and functions of American business.

We believe that

careful planning, plus a certain amount of patient trial and
error will bring a fair solution to the difficulty.

Of course

we do not think that Industrial Democracy can at once be extended to all business firms in the country.
is the result of slow, steady growth.

Anything

org~nic

CHAPTER

V

VOCATIONAL GROUP LEGISLATION
The first problem of vocational group government concerns
the very act of Congress which sets up the industrial selfgovernment machinery.

In the case of the NRA, this was the

NIRA, the National Industrial Recovery Act.

VJhat was the na-

ture of this Act as a legislative technique, and what can it
tell us about a future act necessary to bring about our Industrial Democracy?
First, the NIRA was administrative, executive, or enabling
law. l

That is, the Congress laid down a line of policy, but

the specific detailed content of the law derived from the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Administration, the
Executive, the President of the U.S.

The administration there-

fore exercised in large degree what was really legislative
power.

Moreover, it had some power to interpret the rules and

to settle disputes arising under them, thereby exercising what
are, strictly speaking, judicial powers.

Thus to some extent,

at least, our old traditional division of powers between the

--------

1

For a brief treatment, written before
of the problems of administrative law
Cies, see the Brookings survey, Lyon,
Bennett Munro, "The Government of the
millan, New York City, 1928, 354-5.
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the Schechter deciSion,
by governmental agen31-7. Also, William
United states", Mac-
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legislative, executive and judicial branches of government was
broken down.
Is
not.

~

delegation of powers a bad thing?

Very likely

However, the NRA was, as one Supreme Court Justice put

it, !!delegation run wild".
clared unconstitutional.

For that reason, mainly, it was deThis much we learn, therefore, from

the NIRA •••• any future act must avoid the reef of unconstitutionality.

This should not be a serious problem since the

Congress could ratify in some way the legislation of the executive branch.

The Code Authority could present its plans to

Congress for approval.
Secondly, the NIRA was theoretically coercive legislation
though practically it was rather persuasive than coercive.
Section 3d of the Act 2

enables the President to force the Act

on American business, should it be necessary to do so.

Sec-

tion 4b gives him licensing power over business, that is, ultimately the power of life and death.3
fore the Act was coercive.
these powers.

Theoretically, there-

However the President never used

How much force did the NRA exert - practically?

The answer to that question will vary with every code that was
drafted.

In some cases the NRA deputy administrator was him-

self snowed under by the business trade associations so that he
could hardly be said to have used
2
3

Lyon, 891.
Ibid., 893.

f~ce

on them.

In other
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cases, the Administrator undoubtedly did attempt to coerce
business. 4

However, we believe that as a whole the NRA should

be styled "persuasive" rather than "coercive" legislation.
Should some future Act be coercive or persuasive?

We

believe it should be flexible, that is, coercive enough to
rouse that section of American business and l[cbor which will
resist vocational organization, but not so coercive as to antagonize those who will welcome such organization from the
start.

It is obvious that more or less coercian will have to

be exerted as more or less resistance may be expected from the
different industries.

However it is very important that no

coercion be used which will result in making the various Industrial Groups mere extension tools of the U.S. Government.

The

will to organize vocationally, the enthusiasm, the initiative
should come "from below", from Management and Labor.

Obviously

the first legal steps will have to be taken by the Congress of
the United states.

Obviously too, some government agency will

have to start the ball rolling to organize the many divergent
interests among Labor and Management.
trial

~-government,

But the goal is Indus-

not government controlled Industrial

puppet-government.
It should be obvious too, that we cannot successfully
reach such a goal as this by revolutionary changes but only by
4

Ibid., 134-7.
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evolutionary changes.

The great fault of the

~~A

.,

was that it

tried to launch the ship of industrial democracy before that
ship's hull and launching ways were completed, that is, before
American business and labor were prepared for it.

We must use

the existing agencies we now have in existence and try to
shape them gradually towards industrial democracy.
crete:

To be con-

we must try to refashion the AFL, CIO, Association of

Manufacturers, the various co-operatives, trade associations,
etc., along the lines of industrial democracy.

We cannot

simply junk all our existing agencies and suddenly start an
ideal industrial democracy.

We must use what we have.

We can-

not stop our economic machine; we must remodel it while it runs.
For example, the CIO's Political Action Committee is now (1944)
proposing a National Planning Board which shall encourage
I!the establishment for each industry of an Industry Council
composed of representatives of labor, management, or agriculture if the case requires, and government, to assist in the
formulation and administration of plans for full production
and full employment within such industry".5

Here is an exist-

ing agency which is heading tovvards some sort of an industrial
democracy.

Let it be used, not opposed.

Rather let it be

encouraged and refashioned towards the Pope's Plan for
5

"Economic Democracy", 1.h§. VI/age Earner, Association of
Catholic Trade Unionists, Detroit, July 7, 1944, 2.

r
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industrial democracy.

Only after American labor and management

have been prepared for industrial democracy by education and
experimentation will it be time to talk of formal campaigning
and acts of Congress.

This preparation is now in process.

It

is the job of the Catholic social planner to direct and encourage it.
The second legislative problem concerns those legislative
acts within the industrial groups for their own government.
~vho

were the law makers or the code makers under the NRA?

There were four groups: 1) the code committee representing the
applicant business group, 2) the representatives of the three
advisory boards, 3) the representatives. of the two technical
divisions and 4) the deputy administrator.
~

Code Committee.

Most committees represented trade

associations of business men.

The trade association was the

easily available and obvious foundation upon which the NRA
chose to build its industrial self-government.

The harassed

NRA administrators trying to organize a very disorganized American business in a very short time naturally seized upon whatever shreds of organization they could find.
trade associations.

Such were the

As the NRA put it:

Nearly every principal employer belongs
to what is called a trade association. These
associations were mostly formed long ago for
what mutual help the memb~rs could get by
agreement within the law (the anti-trust laws).
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Ltions; however, it did seem to have the edge over the oth2r
~roups,

excepting perhaps the administrator.

The three Advisory Boards.

These boards were supposed to

represent the three pressure groups interested in the outcome
of the code-law.

However, since they were purely advisory,

they did not have a great deal of real power in the actual formation of the codes.

The Industrial Advisory Board, appointed

by the5ecretary of Commerce, usually rubber-stamped whatever
the business men's Code Committee was trying to put into effect.
The Labor Advisory Board was somewhat more important.
Since it was

~pointed

by the Secretary of Labor, it was inde-

pendent of the direct control of the NRA administration.

It

was made up of leaders of organized labor, and one or two individuals supposedly qualified to represent unorganized labor.
It had a permanent staff of labor specialists and drew heavily
upon the facilities of the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S.
Employment Service, and the Public Health Service.

In those

industries in which organized labor was strong, the members
of the Labor Advisory Board had strong labor backing when they
did their share in negotiating a code. 8

But in those indus-

tries in which organized labor was weak (in 1933, the massproduction inuustries), they had almost no strategic advantage
at allover the other code-makers.

Be i t noted that those

labor leaders on the Board were not from strongly integrated
8

Ibid., 123.
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.,
vertical or industrial uruons simply because there were few
such unions in 1933-4.
The Consumers' ltdvisory BOErd was a kind of odd fish.

It

was appointed by the Administrator and was supposed to represent all the consumers who might be affected by the code legislation.

Actually, however, unlike the industrial and labor

advisory groups, it lacked support from any 'well-organized or
articulate constituency.

Consumers were usually either on

the side of labor or on the side of man&gement; they had no
organized basis for acting as a pressure group, either in initiating measures to protect their interest, or in backing up the
recommendations of the Consumers' Advisory BOard in the code
bargaining process.

Thus the Board had no real bargaining

power.
Representatives of the technical divisions.
sions were Legal and Research and Planning.

These divi-

They did not exert

much influence in the actual framing of the codes unless the
other groups happened to like and support their findings.
~

Deputy Administrator.

In some of the big Codes, Gen.

Johnson himself I?erformed this function.

For the hune_reds of

smaller codes, it was impossible for him to have time to do so.
The deputy administrator, however, had a great deal of power
in the actual framing of the codes. 9 His functions were
9

Ibid., 107.
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multiple:

supervising the bargaining process, entering into

the bargaining process to promote what he understood to be NRA
piicies, reconciling the forces of controversy into some sort
of an agreement, judging the desirability of the result.

We may now ask this question:

Were the code-makers ade-

quately representative of the various pressure groups?
they likely to produce good law?

Were

What warnings does the NRA

set-up give to us about future code-makers in an Industrial
Democracy?

First of all, the Code Committee, representing (so

largely) the trade association, seems to be a necessary and
fair party to code making.

It seems inevitable that the future

social planner will have to deal with trade associations.

Some

industries, of course, will not be very "trade association
conscious".

In those industries, the business houses which are

not members of the trade association will have to be represented
fairly.

NRA tried to do this.

So must the future social plan-

ner.
What about the Advisory Boards?

It might be well in the

future to have an Industrial Advisory Board; however it seems
an unimportant matter and we pass over it here.

But in regard

to the Labor Advisory Board, we want to make what we consider
a very important point.

If this Labor Board is to have real

power it must be composed of the representatives of that industrial union in whose industry the code is now being set up.
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Moreover, the industrial union should have true and strong
bargaining power.

The trouble under the NRA was that Labor

never did have adequate representation in the drafting of the
codes, because

~abor

was unorganized in the mass-production

industries and because labor had not yet become "industry
conscious".

As two CIO writers put it:

Every time management has undertaken by
itself to control the destlliies of an industry, or group of industries, the result has
been monopolistic and essentially undemocratic, because its primary preoccupation has
been with profits and competitive positions.
This is demonstrated by the history of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933-35. 10
Labor must be given a just share of bargaining power in the
framing of the codes.

As we implied, we believe that this can

come only when, as, and if labor is organized along industrial
lines.

Therefore we believe that the growing strength of the

CIO as opposed to the AFL is a good tendency.

We do not claim

that all craft unions must go; but we do believe that the industrial union is an essential element in our Industrial Democracy.

We do not say that under the NRA Labor did not have

at times considerable power.

It did.

of the Bituminous Coal Code.

John Lewis, Philip Murray and

others were in Washington for that job.
fought hard.
10

Especially in the framing

They fought and

But they had power precisely because they were

Golden and Ruttenberg, 330.
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organized industrially, especially once the Northern and
Southern Appalachian fields were united.
What about the Consumers Advisory Board?

It is true that

the rights of consumers must be safeguarded in the framing of
code law.

Any future Industrial Democracy ought to try to do

a better job than the NRA did.

However we do not know just

how this job is to be done since consumers are not as yet a
strong pressure group.

Perhaps appeal could be made to some

existing consumers' associations.
In addition to the question as to

WHO

the code-makers were

and should be, this further question is important:
the code-makers make the codes?
What cap we learn from this?

How did

What was the actual process?

Gen. Johnson describes the pro-

cess actually used in making the codes:
1)

Industry (the Code Committee) was to make
a proposal.

2)

It was to be submitted to a public hearing.

3)

Within NRA itself were departments made
up of accredited representatives of the
three conflicting interests:
Industry
Labor
Consumers

It was to be their business to point out
every Code proposal which they thought might
bear harshly or unfairly on the interests they
represented. They voiced and supported their
protest and ••• be assured ••• they did it. The
Boards not only were to do this themselves
but they were to activate and assist all public
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or private groups of similar interest to
present their cases.
4) These expressed conflicts of interest were
then to be digested and the Deputy Administrator was to seek to compose as many as
could be composed by conference.
5) The Administrator himself, then, with the
aid of the Department of Research and Planning and the Legal Department, was to seek
either to get complete agreement of all conflicting interests, which was geneI-ally done,
or else to narrow the field of disagreement
to a point where a final decision to be recommended to the President would produce
the maximum of fairness and justice and the
minimum of harm to all interests.
Of course we invented this system on the
principle of trial, error and correction. It
was for this r8ason that ••• the writer (Gen.
Johnson) maue his prophecy about dead cats
and his eventual decapitation. That required
no foresight. ll
How did this process really work out in those hectic days of
1933-1934?

In most cases it was impossible for the deputy Ad-

ministrator to retain his position of impartial judge - he was
forced into the fray itself, lending support first to one
group and then to another according to his o'wn idea of desirable economic and social controls, or his own idea of how to
hasten progress on the code.

Rarely could he evaluate the

whole code in the light of carefully analyzed and evaluated
evidence.
11

Rather the code grew, provision by provision, out of

Gen. Hugh Johnson, "The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth!!,
Doubleday Doran, Garden City, New York, 1935, 202.
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bargaining and haggling.
Pity the poor deputyL

He was submerged in a welter of

conflicting testimony and statistics - how could he judge it in
a short time?

There were literally volumes of conflicting facts

and claims brought forth by the two principal gladiators in the
arena - theilide Committee and the Labor Adviser.

Neither the

testimony nor the statistical evidence was entered on the record undsr oath.

There were factions even within the industries

proposing the codes trying to convince the deputy of the dire
consequences that would redound upon them if the code were to
go through.

There was the ac:.vice of the Consumers f Board and

the Research and Planning Board - advice based on the principle
that the bargaining process was bad.
On top of all this, the Deputy had to remember that speed
w,as the big thing - that he should get the codes completed
as rapidly as possible with a minimum of obvious defiCiencies,
with the least possible friction.

He was told that re-employ-

ment considerations (we were at the bottom of the depression
then) because of the emergency situation vvere more important
than long-term rehabilitation.

Johnson puts his policy

clearly:
There were two ways to go about the
NRA job, one was to precede definite recovery action by a slow academic study of all
the complications and contingencies to be
met in code drafting, punctuated by expert
testimony and oriented in the long-term
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effects of those changes in economic balance
that would inevitably result from the new
recovery set-up - that is, in the opinion of
men who, hov{ever rich in academic learning,
never knew the weight of a business responsibility in their whole lives.
The other was to get the codes in, meeting the unemployment situation after some
fashion, cleaning up the work of the economic abuses, putting first things first, letting the minor maladjustments fall where they
might, and dealing with the long-term effects
as they became evident.
The choice was between academic conjecture and action and the decision was for
action •••• 12
Our conclusion about the code-making process is this:

It

was too often marked by selfish log-rolling anQ wild, hasty
compromises which were not likely to serve the good of anybody,
much less the common good.

The cause of this was partly the

code-makers themselves, but mostly the extreme haste with
which the codes were drawn up.

What lessons do we learn there-

fore from this aspect of NRA?

The code-makers of our future i-

deal Industrial Democracy must be much more representative of
Labor, must make public adequate and scientific statistics,
must make their cocies .Y!!!£h more slowly, must give much greater
thought to the general social welfare outside of their own
industrial group, must give more attention to long-term, as
well as merely short-term economic effects.

Of course, wherever

there is law-making by divergent pressure groups there will be
discord, log-rolling, lobbying, etc.
12

In a word, there will

Gen. Hugh Johnson, National Recovery Administration, Jan.
25, 1934, address of Administrator.
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always be "politics".

•

But the excessively tempestuous and

hasty law-making process under the NRA could surely be remedied
in the future by taking the proper safeguards against it.

This

is a problem which the social planner must meet and solve in
advance, being careful not to confuse remedies for emergencies
with long-time reorganization of our social economy.
A third question to be asked about the codes as legislation is this:

What was the typical content of the codes?

It

will not be necessary to examine a large number of codes to
determine this, for they all had many similarities.

The Iron

and Steel Code is sufficiently fundamental to be a type for
the other codes.

The Iron and Steel Code was simply a body of

laws binding the members of the industry subject to the Code
Authority.13

These laws declared their ovVfl purpose (Article II)

who could be members of the Steel Code Group (Article III).
They established very concrete and definite regulations about
rates of pay, hours of labor and other conditions of employment,
(Article IV).

This article recognized labor's right to or-

ganize, condemned child labor (under sixteen) for the industry,
set up geographical wage districts based on varying costs of
living, set minimum rates of pay for common labor for those
13

Lewis Mayers, "A Handbook of NRA", Federal Codes, Inc.,
New York City, 1934, 589 ff.
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districts, (35 cents an hour, for ocample, in the Eastern District), set maximum hours for the industry at 48 hours per
week.

Article V treated

pro~uction

and new capacity.

It re-

fused to control or allocate the volume of production or sales
among the members, believing that the elimination of unfair
trade practices would eliminate any overproduction or inequitable distribution of production or sales.

(It is impor-

tant to note here that we do not claim that all the provisions
of the Iron and Steel Code were practically carried out, or
in practice operated for the common good.

We simply state

what they intended to regulate and perform.)

Article V forbade

the members to expand their plants by new blast furnace, open
hearth or Bessemer steel capacity, unless the Code should be
amended to permit it.

However this article did not seem to re-

strict unduly the changes and technological improvements of the
Steel industry.

No mention was made of new continuous strip

mills, high grade electric furnaces, etc.

Thus the Code seemed

sufficiently flexible to admit of the inevitable improvements
in processing.
Article VI described and delimited the administration of
the steel code.
payment:

Article VII regulated prices and terms of

"None of the members of the Code shall make any sale

of any product at a price or on terms and oonditions more
favorable to the purchaser thereof than the price, terms or
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Thus this article set

base prices, following the multiple basing point system.

Artic~

VIII listed certain unfair practices, the performance of which
would constitute a violation of the Code, (for example,
bribes to purchasers).

Article IX set up the maclunery to pro-

cure adequate reports and statistics for the inaustry.

Article

X treated the all-important subject of penalties and damages,
and stated that "Any violation of any provision of the Code
by any member of the Industry shall constitute a violation
of the Code by such a member."

For violation of the price

laws, the penalty was a fine of $10.00 per ton of the products
so sold.

The other articles regulated general matters, ways

of making amendments to the codes, ways to terminate the code,
etc.
Thus we see, in conclusion, what a typical body of NRA
code law tried to do; namely, to regulate the hours, wages,
prices, quality, etc., in the industry for the professedly
maximum good of the labor, management, and consumers involved.
All the codes in general attempted thiS, though the extent of
the regulationary controls varied in different industries.
Such a content would doubtless be the general content of any
codes set up in our future Industrial Democracy.

CHAPTER V.I
VOCATIONAL GROUP ADMINISTRATION
The problem of administration in self-governing industry
under the NRA presented grave difficulties.

We are concerned

here not with the NRA staff administration problems primarily,
but with the administration problems arising from the industrial
code-groups themselves.

We ask first:

Who were the code ad-

ministrators under the NRA?

Whom did they represent?

"representative" were they?

How were they selected?

ficulties arose because of this set-up?

How
What dif-

What warnings does

this set-up give us as to the planning of a future industrial
democracy?
The Administrators in each code-industry were the "Code
Authorityff, set up to administer the code.

In most cases,

these code authorities were either composed of - or
by -the Trade Association of that industry.l

domina~ed

A survery of 110

codes (the first 100 plus 10 others) showed that in 63 codes,
trade associations ran the show.
were simply and

direct~

Often these associations

appointed by the code.

The fact that in the remaining 47 codes explicit dominance
was not given to a trade association, did not mean that
associations did not get the dominance anyway_
1

Lyon, 206.
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Usually the
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indicate. Its character is sharply seen in
the more extreme proposal that code authorities be composed equally of representatives
of business interests, labor, and consumers,
with a public chairman. This proposal sharply
challenges the conception of "industrial
self-government" which the present form of
code authority supports. It presents the
view that if industry is to be organized collectively, it must be defined as including all
the groups at interest, and not merely the
single group concerned with making a pecuniary gain from industrial operations. There
is great force in this contention. It recognizes what is true, that under the aggregate terms of codes as they now (1934) exist
there resides a considerable power to restrict
the productivity of the economic system to
the detriment of the population dependent
thereon in their roles both as workers and
consumers, so long as such powers exist. It
is very difficult to defend the present basis
of representation in the hands of the only
persons to whose interest it may be to restrict
productive activity. [Jtalics ours~ 2
Taking human nature as it is, it is not likely that justice
will be done to the three groups, management, labor, consumers,
when only one group has any real power in the administration
of the codes, namely management.
How did the Deputy Administrator fit into the picture of
code administration personnel?

Some deputy administrator sat

in every code authority as evidence of NRA's supervisory
responsibility.

In view of the debarment of labor and consumer

groups from any active part in code administration, the deputy
2

Ibid., 213.
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was in a highly crucial position.

He was the only direct avenue

through which the NRA followed up the performance of code authorities and interpreted its policies to such code authorities.
He was the outpost of Uncle Sam in the industrial groups, the
eyes and ears of the government.

He was supposed to guard

against code administration slackness or abuse.

He had a dual

job - to protect basic NRA policies and to be umpire in the
factional disputes of the code authorities themselves.

He

spent much of his time playing umpire.
Actually what happened?

The deputy administrator was too

often poorly informed about the particular industry whose code
he was supposed to be helping to administrate. '"

LJ

The reason

for this was that the NRA was quite unable to secure the
necessary large staff of trained administrators in so shurt a
time.

The result?

The majority of code authorities operated

with considerable independence from close NRA supervision - no
doubt with too much independence.
A typical example of code authority personnel may help to
illustrate our subsequent conclusions.

The Steel Industry un-

der the NRA had for its Code Authority the industry's trade
aSSOCiation, the Iron and Steel Institute plus the Deputy

3

Ibid., 136, n. 27.
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Administrator. The Institute was composed of 32 directors and
a chairman. 4 These men were in large part the president, Congress and Supreme Court of the steel industry's "state" in the
NRA industrial democracy.

The Steel Code permitted 2000 members

or "citizens", (actually there were a little more than 1000
members) who were either individual business men or employees
in the steel business or Corporations or Partnerships.
member had one vote.

Each

In addition each member got more votes in

proportion to his dollar volume of sales of steel.

Thus the

nine largest steel companies in the country controlled 52% of
the vote of the Code Authority.

The pow8rs of the Authority

(which were legal, judicial and. executive) were to gather statistics, rix damages for code violation, waive damages for code
violation, interpret the code, allow deductions below the base
prices for steel, set minimum freight charges, determine new
unfair practices.

The 03 directors were quite independent of

the 1000 or so members.

They needed the approval of the mem-

bers only for new amendments to the code.
We may sum up NRA's warnings as to the personnel of Code
Authorities as follows:

If trade associations are to play an

important role in the forming of a future industrial democracy,
4

Carroll R. Daugherty, Melvin G. de Chazeau, Samuel S.
Stratton. "The Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry",
McGraw-Hill, New York City, 1937, I, 221.
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better provision must be made for non-association members of an
industry.

Consumer interests on the code authority must be

better represented - doubtless through the deputy administrator.
While we must avoid the tianger of too dominant government supervision of the various code authorities, still better supervision will be necessary than was had under the NRA.

This

could be had by insisting on better, and less hastily, trained
deputy administrators.

Lastly, and most important of all, ade-

quate labor participation in the code authorities is surely
necessary
democracy.

a

condition for the success of any future industrial
Mere advisory staffs will not be enough.

must have a voting power on each coae authority.

Labor

The details

of code authority structure vvill (and doubtless should) vary
from industry to industry, but we believe that the above warnings from the NRA experiment in industrial democracy must be
heeded if any true system of industrial democracy is to succeed
in the future.
The administrative problem of vocational group government
has another aspect; namely, how did the administrators administrate?

How were the code laws of the NRA experiment in In-

dustrial Democracy actually executed?
execution give us for the future?

What warnings does such

Code administration involved

many difficulties, but the most important of these was the
great difficulty of getting code violators to comply with the
code.

We have much to learn from the compliance problem.
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How was compliance effected under the NRA?
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In most cases,

violators of codes were handled not by the various code authorities but by the compliance division of the NRA staff itself.
This staff was highly decentralized into regional and state
offices.

Only a small residue of complaints reached the -fiash-

ington COllipliance Division.
enforcement.

The NRA had no airect powers of

It had only indirect powers such as

the Blue Eagle and the threat of prosecution.

removal of

The Legal Divi-

sion of the NRA staff prepared cases against code violators for
the Federal Courts.

However it could not actually prosecute;

this could be done only by the various district attorneys of
the Department of Justice.

This whole machinery was rather

cumbrous technically and rather delicate in human relationships.
The experience of the NRA compliance agencies demonstrated
that the compliance problem was almost wholly a problem of the
non-compliance of small business units. 5 Compliance was poorest under the codes whose constituent businesses were quite
small, and also among the little fellows in the big code groups.
There was almost no compliance problem among large manufacturing enterprises except for some minor technical violations.
Compliance was also bad in economically backward regions such
as the Ozarks where, for instance, it was almost impossible to
enforce the canning code.
5

Lyon, 260.
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Why did the NRA experiment fail to enforce its

law~?

In

the first place the philosophy of NRA was that the various industrial code groups should attain some real self-governmentthat these authorities would handle their own complaints and
see to the enforcement of tl1eir own codes (short of actual federal prosecution, of course.)

Thus the government's police

work was to be secondary and mainly temporary.

As a matter of

cold fact, however, the code authorities were not equipped to
effect compliance; nor did they do so.

The result was that the

job fell to the compliance division of the NRA staff.
staff was greatly undermanned.

Now this

Not only was it unable to go

out actively and check on the observance of codes by business,
but it was unable (even by sitting passively in its offices)
to handle the flood of complaints on non-compliance coming in
to it from business and labor.

The result?

Flagrant viola-

tions of code laws everywhere.

It was an embarrassing situa-

tion to be irl, and a demoralizing one. 6
For a future industrial democracy a very large number of
observers (or "inspectors" or "policemen fl ) will be necessary
to check on business and labor and to gather evidence on compliance.

Should these inspectors be part of a U.S. Government

staff, or should they be subject to each Code Authority?

We

believe that the inspection and complaints side of effecting
6

Ibid., 272.
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compliance should be handled entirely by the Code Authorities
who best

y~OW

their

O\Vll

peculiar problems.

We also believe that

the vocational groups should have the power, as far as possible,
to enforce their own laws by their own complaints departments,
fines, etc.

of course their decisions would be subject to ap-

peal to the U.S. Courts.
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in an orderly, democractic way.

Thus we see that in tJ,lls re-

gard, the Pope's Plan is eminently practical; it builds on existing economic conditions.
2)

Since there is basic unity within a given business

firm, it is important that organized labor be given fair representation and some voting po,'ier as to the management of that
firm.

Is this practicable?

There will be huge opposition

from some businessmen, of course.

Yet

surely it can be shown

to businessmen that they can profit in the long run if a fair
share in management be given to organized labor.

In fact there

are many cases touay in which orbanized labor has much to say
about management, affecting not only wages and hours but production-conditions and prices.

These cases prove that such a

system can be oPerated successfully and peacefully.
is a unity of interest, there

~

Since there

be peaceful co-operation.

Both employers and employees recognize the bond uniting them
into a lil" tIe

IT

societylT •

Each group mus t recognize the bther' s

right to a voice in settling their common economic problems.
Both groups must be willing to make concessions.

Where these

conditions have been given a fair trial such co-operation has
worked in American business.

It is not a mere dream; it is a

fact.
3)

We should also recognize the basic unity which actually

does exist within American industrial groups, at least in the
basic industries.

Our business firms do fall fairly -iiTell into
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na.turally unified "vocational groups".
onstrated this unity.

The NRA experiment dem-

The fact that economic prosperity varies

El £roups demonstrates it.

The fact that business firms are

mutually interdependent within the groups demonstrates it.

A

ma.jor element of the Pope's Plan is that it builds upon vocational group unity.

But this unity already exists in American

economic life, as we have said, at least in the basic industries.

We need only recognize it, use it, build upon it.

Thus

we see that the underlying conditions presupposed by the Pope'S
Plan are verified in the United states.
4)

That vocational group unity be best expressed, the

number of groups must be Jept at a minimum and should be far
less than the 750 co de groups which existed under the NRA.

It

should be possible to keep the number from swelling beyond all
control if industrial democracy is begun slowly and in the
basic industiies first.
5)

However, in spite of the natural unity which exists

within our various industrial groups, there will always remain
the problem of preventing excessive overlapping of the groups
and the resulting jurisdictional conflicts.
not be severe in the basic industries.
the fuel industries:
dustries:

This problem will

Such industries are

coal, oil, power; the raw-materials in-

iron, steel, aluminum, rubber, chemicals; the dur-

able goods industries:

autos, clothing; the foods industries:

-
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canners,

packers~

the large wholesaling industries.

Industrial

Democracy should be begun in these large basic industries first.
Let the small manufacturer of unusual
trade be organized later.

pro~ucts

and the retail

Of course a workable compromise will

have to be set up between vertical coce groups and horizontal,
between circular (many-product) groups and straight-line (oneproduct) groups.

And the multiple coverage of one business

firm by many code groups will have to be eliminated.
~e

suggest that if a firm finds it may be covered by sever-

al different code groups, it should have the option of choosing
whatever group it wants.

Such freedom seems essential if the

system is to be truly democratic.

If tillS freddom means that

many firms will take the line of least resistance and affiliate themselves witll groups willch favor stockholders to the
detriment

of labor and consumers, then some standards of choice

can be established within which the freedom will operate.
However, this freedom of choice should be safeguarded.

It is

true that the whole problem of overlapping is difficult.
surely it can be solved in a practical way,

But

if the Pope's Plan

is begun first in the rather homogeneous basic industries.
6)

The series of

ch~nges

leading to Industrial Democracy

must be evolutionary and not revolutionary as they were under
the NRA.

Probably the changes in our basic industries during

the last fifty years have rendered those industries fit to
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receive some sort of industrial democracy almost at once.

But

that our total American economy should be transformed into a
working industrial democracy overnight or even within a few
years

seems to be utterly impracticable.

However when the

basic industries are operating successfully on a vocational basis, they will offer a powerful incentive to the rest of business to follow suit.
Evolutionary change means first that we should not cast
aside our existing labor organizations as outmoded or inadequate, but we should refashion them towards the lines of Industrial Democracy.

The CIO, for example, being an association

of industrial unions, has alreaQy begun to shape labor's role
for industrial

democra~y.

In fact the CIO has already become

"vocational group conscious", as is indicated by the nIndustry
Councils Plan n of its president, Mr. Philip Murray.
lic social planner can, and should, use the CIO.

The Catho-

He should try

to impregnate it with the ideals and principles of the Pope's
Plan.

The AFL, being an association of craft and trade unions,

can also help the Catholic social planner.

It is true that the

AFL will be less useful than the CIO in helping to organize the
basic industries vocationally.

But the AFL may be very useful

later on in helping to sprtjad Industrial Democracy beyond the
basic industries to the·rnore independent trades and crafts.
Thus we see that from the point of view of labor organization,
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the Pope's

Plan seems eminently feasible in the United States.

We must also use, as far' as pOSSible, our existing management agencies and trade associations.

We must try to reshape

them for their important part in Industrial Democracy.
possible?

Is this

It is, if the proper education and incentives be

given to the management class.
come from this class.

Much opposition will undoubtedly

However a philosophy of social respon-

sibility is growing among business managers.

There are hopeful

signs that businessmen might welcome industrial democracy especially since it is an alternative to burocratic federal control of our economic life.
Lastly, evolutionary change means

th~t

in the actual forma-

tion of the vocational groups, their code-laws must not be drawn
up in the hectic haste of a few months by "log-rolling" and
extravagant compromises designed to get the code established
rather than to serve the common good.

Years may be necessary

between first code-law negotiations and final ratification.
Attention must be given to long-term as vvell as to short-term
economic effects.
7)

There should be every allowance for flexibility of

organizational framework and law content among the various vocational groups.

What is good for one group, the Coal Mining

Group, for example, may not be suited at all for another group,
such as the Automobile Group.

Furthermore, all the groups
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should be flexible enough to handle technological progress
and

inventions smoothly.

Flexibility can be made feasible, we be-

lieve, if sufficient self-determination is given to the groups,
and if fair representation is given to labor, management and
the U. s. GoverI1ll1ent to determine policies ,;vi thin and between
the various groups.
8)

The initiative towards Industrial Democracy should

come "from belowtt, from managemeont ana. .Labor as much as poss1b.le,
and not "from above", from Washington.

Of course an act of

Congress will be necessary ultimately to put industrial democracy into effect.

But this act should be persuasive rather

than coercive legislation.

Moreover, in order that laws passed

under the authority of this act be constitutional, they should
be approved by Congress.
9)

The various vocational group administrators must be

both unprejudiced men and yet intimately familiar with all the
conditions of their respective groups.

It sel::;ms quite possible

to secure an adequate number of such men, especially if the
industrial democracy idea grows SIOVlly.

No doubt many of them

could be secured from the many WaShington bureaus, as, so we
hope, those bureaus are gradually dissolved.
10)

Prosecution

and trial of code-law violators should

be handled as far as possible by the vocational groups themselves, with appeal, if necessary, to the U.S. Department of
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Inspectors, "policemen", and com-

plaints-adjusters should doubtless be subject directly to the
various Vocational Group Authorities.

The problem of getting

small, scattered businesses to comply with the code will surely
be grave.

But once again, if Industrial Democracy is begun

gradually, and first in the basic industries, this problem of
effecting compliance will not be an immediate one.

For in the

basic industries at least, compliance can be rather readily secured.
It will not be easy for the Catholic social planner to
work out all these problems and suggestions presented by the
NRA experiment.

However they are not insoluble.

Hence we are

convinced that the Pope's Plan can be practically worked out
for the United states.

We are not over enthusiastic.

is necessary; research is necessary.

Education

Above all, a better ob-

servance of the moral law by lllore of our citizens is necessary_
But with time and work and gradual change, we believe Industrial Democracy can be woven into American life.

It will not

solve all our economic problems of price control, monopoly, and
so forth,automatically.

Rather it will merely provide the or-

ganizational machinery to solve those problems.

But such a

machinery is surely the only machinery which can do the job.
It is the reasonable, middle ground machinery between the
burocracy of state socialism and the old cutthroat individual-
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ism of "laissez-faire".

In the vocational group system our

social order may be expected to find stability at last.
the Catholic challenge to the future.

It is
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